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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written on the general subject of how 
modern systems of intellectual property do, can, and should 
affect the lives and welfare of indigenous peoples.1  When the 
focus is on biotechnology, however, copyright does not play 
much of a role in protecting functional inventions,2 and while 
trade secret is important, no biotechnology issues specific to the 
interests of indigenous peoples are apparent.3  This paper 
                                                          
    ©      2006 Dennis S. Karjala. 
     *     Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Arizona State University.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges numerous helpful comments on an earlier draft from 
Aaron Fellmeth, Robert Clinton, and Douglas Sylvester.  An earlier draft of 
this paper was presented at a conference entitled "Intellectual Property and 
Biotechnology in the Age of Globalization: Challenges, Opportunities and 
Risks," Sept. 19-20, 2003, at the University of British Columbia. 
 1. See Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond 
Intellectual Property in Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 633, 669-70 
(2003) (concluding that the justifiable claims of indigenous peoples with 
respect to their intangible cultural heritage can often be dealt with by 
applying concepts from the law of contract, privacy, trade secret, and 
trademark, but rejecting, as fundamentally antithetical to basic notions of free 
expression and the overall dissemination and development of culture, an 
expansion of the patent or copyright regimes by allowing group rights in 
otherwise publicly accessible works arising out of indigenous cultural 
tradition). 
 2. See Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject 
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439 (2003) (arguing that functional subject matter 
belongs under the patent, and not the copyright, regime). 
 3. A modification of trade secret law aimed at protecting group privacy 
interests in sacred symbols and rituals might be effective.  See Paterson & 
Karjala, supra note 1, at 665-66.   Aaron Fellmeth has suggested that some 
might argue for a collective trade secret in the indigenous use of herbs or other 
natural materials, including biological materials.  Such knowledge might 
qualify for protection under ordinary modern trade secret law because it may 
have independent economic value resulting from its not being generally known 
and the group may take reasonable measures to maintain secrecy.  See  
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537-51 (1980 & Supp. 1986) 
(defining “trade secret”).  Article 39(2) of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires such protection for 
“natural and legal persons.”  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].  It is not much of a step further to 
recognize protection for cultural or ethnic groups collectively if the other 
conditions of trade secret protection are satisfied.  To the extent that such 
knowledge is ineligible for trade secret protection, the problem is essentially 
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therefore concentrates on how patent rights in biotechnology 
affect the legitimate concerns of indigenous peoples. 
Two issues in particular dominate the literature of biotech 
patents in the context of globalization and indigenous peoples’ 
rights.  The first is the use of traditional indigenous knowledge 
as a starting point for producing a valuable product, such as a 
medicine.  The second is the patentability of gene-sequence and 
gene-product information taken from living organisms, 
especially human beings.  While perhaps related (when, for 
example, the genetic information is taken from an indigenous 
group), it clarifies the analysis to attempt a conceptual 
separation between these two issues.  The first raises questions 
of so-called “biopiracy” of indigenous information by developed 
countries.  As such, it directly implicates the rights of 
indigenous peoples, even though most of these issues can be 
resolved when a few basic principles of patent law are brought 
to the fore.  The second issue necessitates important ethical 
inquiries and also poses fundamental questions for patent law 
and patent policy, especially when information concerning the 
human genome is involved.  Most of these problems, however, 
are not specific to the impact of biotechnology on indigenous 
peoples, and indeed many of them affect all people, whether 
living in a developing or a developed country.  Parts II and III 
develop these arguments. 
Having set aside patents as an important cause of 
biopiracy and having shown that gene and gene-product 
patents do not pose problems specific to indigenous peoples, 
Part IV attempts to outline the real problems that the global 
patent system poses for developing countries.  While it is 
difficult to make the case that adoption of a modern patent 
system supplies a direct benefit to developing countries, Part 
IV concludes that the worldwide patent system has little direct 
adverse effect either.  The problem is not the existence of 
patents that prevents the diffusion of biotechnological advances 
in developing countries, so much as the danger of “leakage” 
through importing of patented products from developing 
countries back to developed countries with strong patent 
systems.  Too much leakage can impair incentives for 
innovation even within the developed world, which would not 
be good for anyone. 
This last conclusion rests upon a basic assumption that 
                                                          
that of “biopiracy” discussed in Part II below. 
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underlies the entire paper.  Whether and to what degree patent 
law serves as an incentive to innovate or commercialize 
innovations remains a matter of serious debate.  Is patent law 
too strong or too weak?  Is the period of patent protection too 
long or too short?  We do not know very much about how the 
incentives of our intellectual property systems work in 
practice.4  This paper does not aim at a fundamental analysis of 
the patent system generally.  It therefore assumes that the 
patent system in developed countries generally achieves its 
basic goal of stimulating innovation by providing a period of 
exclusive rights to those whose intellectual creations qualify for 
patent protection.5 
II. “BIOPIRACY” AND PATENTS 
A. THE BASIC PROBLEM 
The biopiracy problem is exemplified by the taking of 
indigenous peoples’ information concerning the medicinal 
effects of a plant or other natural substance and developing it 
into a patented and popular drug by large pharmaceutical 
companies.6  The fundamental question is whether or to what 
degree it is fair for outsiders to use, and especially to profit 
from, this knowledge.  In earlier work, Robert Paterson and I 
                                                          
 4. Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 139 (2000). 
 5. For a recent critique of this assumption, arguing that incentive-based 
justifications for intellectual property fail, see Adam D. Moore, Intellectual 
Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based 
Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601 (2003). 
 6. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, AM. ASS’N FOR 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3, 5, 11, 14 (2003) [hereinafter AAAS 
HANDBOOK] (discussing  the use of plao-noi in Thailand to treat ulcers, of the 
hoodia cactus by African King Bushmen to stave off hunger, of turmeric for 
wound healing and neem as a pesticide in India, of ayahuasca in the Amazon 
basin for sacred religious and healing purposes, of maca (Lepidium meyenii) in 
the Andes for increased fertility, and of j’oublie in Camaroon and Gabon as a 
sweetener).  The European Patent Office upheld the revocation of a patent on 
a neem-derived antifungal agent on the ground that prior existing knowledge, 
even though not written or published, could be used to challenge a patent.  
India Hails EPO Ruling Against Patent Relating to Traditional Knowledge, 19 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., Apr. 2005, available at 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/wipr.nsf/is/a0b0q7m3d0. 
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considered this problem from the point of view of indigenous 
rights outside the traditional patent and copyright regimes.  
We concluded that a statute based on traditional principles of 
contract and unfair competition law could address and likely 
resolve this problem without raising the fundamental 
difficulties that would result from using traditional intellectual 
property rights of patent or copyright law.7  This article now 
addresses the problem from the other side: what, if anything, 
about patent law creates or exacerbates the problem of 
biopiracy? 
B. PHYSICAL VERSUS INFORMATIONAL RESOURCES 
In considering the problem of biopiracy, it is vital to 
distinguish between use of a physical resource and use of an 
informational resource.  Physical resources are depletable; 
what one person uses is no longer available to another.  
Informational resources are nondepletable (infinitely 
multipliable) in that one person’s use of information does not 
prevent another from making the same or different use of it.8  
This is why intellectual property is fundamentally different 
from tangible property, and why the legal rules relating to 
intellectual property must also be different.  This point is 
obvious, indeed almost trite, to intellectual property scholars, 
but it often seems to be overlooked in the literature on 
biopiracy.9 
                                                          
 7. Paterson & Karjala, supra note 1, at 662-67. 
 8. As Mark Lemley has stated: 
The economic rationale underlying much privatization of land, the 
tragedy of the commons, simply does not apply to information goods.  
It is possible to imagine physical bandwidth or server capacity being 
overconsumed, although the danger of that currently seems remote.  
But it is not possible to imagine overconsumption of a nonrivalrous 
thing like data. . . . From an economic perspective, the more people 
who can use information, the better. 
 Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 536 (2003) 
(citations omitted). 
 9. For example, see Audrey R. Chapman, Approaching Intellectual 
Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c), U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/12 
(2000) (treating as biopiracy the patenting of plants long cultivated in other 
cultures with no benefit going back to the group that developed them); AAAS 
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that “biopiracy” is used to describe the 
misappropriation of knowledge and/or biological materials from traditional 
communities); and Barbara Looney, Should Genes Be Patented? The Gene 
Patenting Controversy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an 
International Agreement, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 240 n.40 (1994) 
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In one of the strongest condemnations of “biocolonialism” 
that I have read, Professor Laurie Anne Whitt states, “[b]y 
allowing access to and exportation of data, biocolonialism 
concentrates knowledge about a people and their environment 
in the hands of an imperial power.”10  This is simply wrong.  
Publicly available knowledge cannot be concentrated in the 
hands of anyone.  Perhaps Professor Whitt intended to say that 
the use of some indigenous knowledge is concentrated under 
the patent system in outsiders who obtain foreign patents 
based on some of the exported data.  But even that would not 
be correct if the implication is that the source peoples can no 
longer use their traditional knowledge in their traditional 
ways. 
Professor Whitt also presents an extended theoretical 
analysis of “extractive biocolonialism,” defined as the coercive 
conversion into private property of indigenous genetic resources 
typically resulting in such things as environmental damage, 
physical and spiritual erosion of indigenous health or welfare, 
destabilization of social, economic, or legal structures, and 
similar problems.11  Essentially all of the results she attributes 
to this coercive conversion are derived from physical extraction 
of resources or direct imposition of outside legal and moral 
values.  As discussed below, coercion of any kind is to be 
deplored and sanctioned.  When, however, the action does not 
go beyond noting and using information that is legally 
available under local rules,  “coercion,” and its comparably 
negative relatives such as “misappropriation” or “exploitation,” 
are simply inapt labels, because the culture from which the 
information derives remains free to use the information as it 
had in the past.12  Professor Paul Heald has cogently argued 
                                                          
(worrying that gene patents might exploit mankind’s universal heritage to 
create products sold at prices prohibitive to developing countries).  An early 
example of the erroneous conflation of physical and informational resources is 
Johan Galtung’s statement that “[a] major aspect of scientific colonialism is 
the idea of unlimited right of access to data of any kind, just as the colonial 
power felt it had the right to lay its hand on any product of commercial value 
in the territory.”  Johan Galtung, After Camelot, in THE RISE AND FALL OF 
PROJECT CAMELOT: STUDIES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 281, 300 (Irving Louis Horowitz ed., 1967). 
 10. Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property & the 
New Imperial Science, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 211, 220 (1998). 
 11. See id. at 214-15. 
 12. Cf. Chapman, supra note 9, at 17 (noting that traditional knowledge 
rarely qualifies for intellectual property protection, rendering it vulnerable to 
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that focusing the rhetoric of biopiracy on intellectual property 
rights is actually counterproductive to the goals of most 
advocates of indigenous peoples.13 
On the other hand, it is incorrect to say that, in general, a 
patent owner is not harmed by the sale of unauthorized copies 
of the patented product, on the ground that the patent owner 
remains free to sell any amount of the product he chooses.14  
There is absence of harm only if a purchase of the pirated 
product does not substitute for purchase of the patented 
product.  While this is often the case because some purchasers 
of a pirated product would wholly forgo its use rather than pay 
the higher price of an authorized version, there are likely to be 
at least a few people who would pay the higher price if less 
expensive versions were unavailable.  Moreover, if pirated 
drugs sold at a low price in poorer countries find their way back 
to developed countries, they may displace further sales and 
thereby reduce the patentee’s profits. 
Nondepletability of informational resources implies that 
once the information is publicly available, it is economically 
inefficient to afford exclusive rights in it.15  We grudgingly 
accept the limited-term exclusive rights of patent and 
copyright, notwithstanding the ex post economic inefficiency, 
because we believe that they serve as an incentive to the 
creation of desirable works.  In other words, we accept the 
immediate economic inefficiency for the duration of the rights 
in the belief that in the long run we will have more desirable 
works overall.  Calls for exclusive rights in information outside 
                                                          
“expropriation and inappropriate utilization” by outsiders); Zita Lazzarini, 
Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Under TRIPS and 
the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 113 (2003) (noting that 
the difficulty in patenting indigenous knowledge renders it vulnerable to “use 
or exploitation” by others). 
 13. Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 519 (2003). 
 14. Nadia Natasha Seeratan, Comment, The Negative Impact of 
Intellectual Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries: An Examination 
of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339, 353-54 (2001). 
 15. See supra note 8.  On the economic inefficiency of protecting works 
that have already been created, see also Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of 
Copyright, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, 
EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY 33, 42-44 (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997).  For a basic 
analysis of the underlying theories of property as they relate to traditional 
property (rivalrous in consumption) and intellectual property (nonrivalrous in 
consumption), see Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the 
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that 
for both types of property utilitarian tradeoffs are necessary). 
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the patent and copyright regimes, especially for rights in 
information that is already publicly known, cannot be justified 
by a similar creation incentive.  Some other justification is 
necessary. 
I will note only in passing that the other justification will 
be difficult to find in so-called natural rights theory.  Natural 
rights theory (“I made it so it is mine”) carries no limitation on 
the duration of protection, nor can it distinguish between the 
rights afforded by patent and copyright for works that are 
equally intellectually creative.  Some of the most creative works 
of human history, like Newton’s theory of gravity or Einstein’s 
theories of relativity, get no protection anywhere under either 
the patent or the copyright regime.  This is difficult to explain if 
natural rights to one’s creative ideas and discoveries are the 
basis for exclusive rights.  Moreover, if natural rights are the 
basis for protection, copyright could not distinguish, as it does 
universally, between protected “expression” and unprotected 
“idea.”  Often the idea underlying a work is its most creative 
element.16  Finally, in the case of indigenous populations who 
assert natural rights in information they have developed or 
discovered, mutuality demands a similar recognition of rights 
in information developed elsewhere.  Such recognition, 
however, would surely cost any given group much more than it 
gains.  Professor Heald also argues that natural rights theories 
of Locke and Hegel – “the rhetoric of philosophy and moral 
entitlement” – do not even in their own terms effectively supply 
a basis for intellectual property rights in information 
discovered by indigenous groups.17 
1. Depletion of Physical Resources 
To the extent the biopiracy complaint is that a physical 
resource is being depleted, it is something that may be 
controlled by the environmental regulations of the source 
country.  In other words, this is not an intellectual property 
rights question but one of tangible property.  There is no 
significant debate today that taking such resources without 
authority (theft) or by fraud is and should be unlawful.  A 
                                                          
 16. See Karjala, supra note 15, at 42-43; Dennis S. Karjala, Federal 
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 512, 
517 (1997). 
 17. Heald, supra note 13, at 527-30. 
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patent elsewhere on the active ingredient of the plant simply 
has nothing to do with the problem of environmental depletion.  
If the patentee can manufacture the active ingredient 
synthetically, that activity does not contribute to further 
depletion.  If the patentee needs the plant itself but can grow it 
away from its original source, again there is no contribution to 
depletion in the source country.  And if the plant grows only in 
the source country, the existence of a patent abroad or even in 
the source country itself gives no right to take the physical 
plant to manufacture the patented product.  While the patent 
on the active ingredient, if recognized in the source country, 
would give the patentee the legal right to prevent others from 
taking the physical plant for the purpose of extracting the 
active ingredient, exercise of that right would likely mean less 
depletion of the physical resource, because it would no longer 
be in anyone’s economic interest to take more of it than is 
required by traditional uses.  The patent thus may add a little 
something to the source country’s power to regulate depletion, 
but it cannot exacerbate the depletion if the source country 
chooses to prohibit the patentee’s taking of the plant. 
For example, Professor Whitt describes how the Brazilian 
Guajajara treated glaucoma with a local plant now depleted by 
exports valued at $25 million per year, with corporations 
holding patents earning even more.18  To the extent depletion of 
the plant is the problem, this dispute would seem to be between 
the Guajajara and the Brazilian government, not between the 
Guajajara and the foreign patentees.  Brazil has the legal right 
and power to regulate or even prohibit the exportation of the 
plant in question, especially if it is in danger of depletion.  If 
the glaucoma treatment is now well-known throughout the 
world, denying a patent would likely exacerbate demand for the 
plant in question.  If the complaint is that only the Guajajara 
should be able to use the treatment, the question is why a 
remedy for a worldwide ailment should be so confined.  Would 
anyone deny the Guajajara the benefits of medical advances 
discovered elsewhere, whether or not patented?  And if the 
complaint is that the Guajajara are entitled some recompense 
for their contribution to medical knowledge, we need only note 
here that there will be no profits to share unless the knowledge 
has led to a patent.  Monopoly rents that would otherwise flow 
from the patent simply will not exist after the market competes 
                                                          
 18. Whitt, supra note 10, at 213-14. 
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the price down to marginal cost. 
2. Depletion of Informational Resources 
Where the complaint is that the source country’s people are 
not rewarded for supplying the information leading to the 
invention, several points should be kept in mind.  First, no 
patented invention based on the information can cover any 
prior use the source country’s people made of the original 
resource.  The source country’s long use of the plant for 
particular medicinal or other purposes would render any claim 
that covered such a use (in the original source country) invalid 
for want of novelty.  Indeed, that country may well be in a 
position to refuse a patent altogether if the end product is a 
naturally occurring substance.  Even U.S. patent law, until 
relatively recently, denied patents on naturally occurring 
substances.19  The whole notion of composition-of-matter 
patents on naturally occurring substances is shaky under U.S. 
patent law itself, resting on a rationale that it is the isolated 
and purified form of the substance that is patented, not the 
substance as it exists in nature.20  Moreover, the Agreement on 
                                                          
 19. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double 
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology 
Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 366-84 (2002) (arguing that naturally occurring 
substances were long deemed by courts to be unpatentable, and Congress 
showed no intent in the 1952 Patent Act to change that). 
 20. Another ground for denying such patents in the United States could 
be created by removing the geographical limitation on prior uses that 
disqualify an invention for a patent.  A patent is denied when “the invention 
was known or used by others in this country” prior to the applicant’s invention 
of it or where the invention was “in public use or on sale in this country” more 
than one year prior to the filing of the current patent application.  35 U.S.C. § 
102(a), (b) (2000).  If public use anywhere in the world were disqualifying, 
many patents based on naturally occurring substances would be blocked.  See 
generally Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of 
Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004).  Professor Margo Bagley has 
argued recently that the geographical limitations on disqualifying prior art 
under § 102(a) and (b) are unconstitutional because they have come to be in 
conflict with the constraints on congressional power under the intellectual 
property clause of the Constitution.  Margo A. Bagley, Patently 
Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 690 (2003).  Professor Bagley wrote, however, prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998, which appears to delegate all interpretations of the 
intellectual property clause, including the constraints on congressional power 
contained therein, to Congress itself.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 
(2003). 
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) 
requires member states to have patent laws protecting 
inventions that are “new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application,”21 but TRIPS nowhere defines 
“new.”  Any member state is therefore free to deny patents 
covering naturally occurring substances or traditionally used 
methods of treatment because they are not “new.”  They can 
also deny method patents covering the use of naturally 
occurring substances, purified or not, for therapeutic or 
diagnostic purposes.22  Moreover, following traditional U.S. 
law, they could find that isolating and purifying such 
substances lacks “invention” and therefore does not involve an 
“inventive step.” 
Second, where the end product is a substantial 
modification of the original source23 and constitutes a true 
invention that has greater therapeutic value, a patent in the 
source country will indeed allow the patentee to charge, for the 
period of the patent, a monopoly price there for use of the new 
drug (assuming there is no effective substitute that could hold 
down the price).  If people in the source country cannot afford 
the new drug, their position is no different from that with 
respect to any other new drug, whether or not patented, or 
indeed any other product, that they cannot afford.  They have 
not lost anything that they previously had.  They can continue 
to use the original source as they always did, and they now 
have the possibility of more effective therapy (if they can afford 
it), as will indigenous (and other) peoples elsewhere who never 
had the original treatment.24  It is important to note that most 
indigenous groups will have no resources at all, genetic or 
otherwise, on which profitmaking products can be built.25  All 
                                                          
 21. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 27(1). 
 22. Id. at art. 27(3)(a). 
 23. This is likely to be the case, at least in the United States, for any 
biotech patent based on indigenous information.  Simply claiming a procedure 
observed in use by an indigenous group outside the United States is likely to 
result in an invalid patent, because U.S. patent law requires that the patent 
applicant be the inventor.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (listing as an exception to 
patent entitlement that the applicant “did not himself invent the subject 
matter sought to be patented”). 
 24. See also Heald, supra note 13, at 527 (“[N]o international patent can 
diminish [the indigenous group’s] ability to cultivate, maintain, and use their 
existing resources.”). 
 25. See Chen, supra note 20, at 569-72 (noting that while most drugs are 
derived from natural sources, the huge preponderance of species lacks 
commercial value). 
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such people potentially benefit if patent law serves as an 
incentive to the creation of products that meet important 
human needs. 
The wider availability of both the original treatment and 
the newly developed drug after “biopiracy” perhaps deserves 
more emphasis.  Professor Whitt states, “[a]cross the planet, at 
an accelerating pace, collectively owned traditional medicines 
and seeds are being privatized and commodified.  Altered 
sufficiently to render them patentable, they are transformed 
into the ‘inventions’ of individual scientists and corporations, 
and placed on sale in the genetic marketplace.”26  It is difficult 
to see just how the people who “collectively owned” the 
forerunners of the now improved medicines and seeds have 
been harmed.  Furthermore, the improved products are now 
available to a much wider range of users, including indigenous 
peoples from other parts of the globe.  The patent may, indeed, 
mean that the price everywhere is higher than it would be were 
the product available without patent protection.  It remains a 
fair question, however, whether the improved product would 
exist at all but for the patent incentive.  We must bear in mind 
that no one is forced to buy the new product.  Everyone is free 
to continue using whatever he has used in the past.  Those who 
do choose to buy patented seed, for example, presumably 
believe that the higher seed cost is more than compensated by 
the beneficial improvements brought about by the newer 
product.  It is true that patent law does not do much to 
alleviate the most important problems facing the people of 
developing countries, such as poverty, contaminated water, and 
lack of education.  In developing countries, 840 million people 
currently suffer from malnutrition and 1.3 billion are afflicted 
with poverty.27  To the extent patent law serves as an incentive 
to the development of new products, especially medicines and 
improved agricultural varieties, it marginally increases the 
options of everyone, including indigenous peoples, to improve 
their lives.  If the goal is to alleviate the wretched conditions 
under which many people in developing countries live, it cannot 
                                                          
 26. Whitt, supra note 10, at 250. 
 27. Tara Kowalski, International Patent Rights and Biotechnology: Should 
the United States Promote Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, 25 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 42 (2002) (citing CLIVE JAMES, GLOBAL 
STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED TRANSGENIC CROPS: 2000 § 1 (2000), available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/Publications/pdfs/isaaabriefs/Briefs%2021.pdf). 
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be right to say that information held by some of them that 
could be useful in addressing certain problems should remain 
confined to the small group that discovered it, provided at least 
that the information is acquired in ways that are both legally 
and morally proper. 
Third, denying patents in these cases will not necessarily 
stop the supposed “misuse” of the original information.  It may 
well be “commodified” by an outsider anyway in the hope of 
sufficient return from first mover or secrecy advantages.  If, 
therefore, we are to accept the economic inefficiency of 
recognizing exclusive rights in information held by indigenous 
societies, some justification that outweighs the inefficiency 
should be offered.  As mentioned above, creation incentives are 
not involved, which distinguishes this information from that 
protected by patent and copyright.  Claims of unfairness in 
these scenarios should articulate precisely what is unfair about 
developing, perhaps at great expense, something new and 
useful out of existing knowledge (which is what the patent 
incentive is all about).  If the unfairness in a particular case is 
acquisition of information by fraud or other surreptitious or 
dishonest means, existing legal principles may supply a 
remedy, or at least an approach for statutory regulation.28  If 
the unfairness is lack of equal bargaining power because of 
ignorance of western legal customs, again a limited statutory 
approach setting default assumptions on an agreement to pay a 
royalty or some other compensation may be in order.29  As  
Moore v. Regents of the University of California30 shows, using 
information to create a patented product without adequate 
disclosure to the source of the information is not limited to 
developing countries or indigenous populations.31  Breach of a 
                                                          
 28. See Paterson & Karjala, supra note 1, at 665-66 (arguing that a 
statute modeled on trade secret law and aimed at prohibiting the public 
display of sacred symbols and rituals could be effective in protecting group 
privacy interests in such symbols and rituals); see also Chen, supra note 20, at 
579-81 (explaining how traditional trade secret law can be adapted to embrace 
ethnobiological knowledge but warning how “propertizing” such knowledge 
lacks an economically justifiable basis and that maintaining secrecy would 
impede the progress of science). 
 29. See Paterson & Karjala, supra note 1, at 662-65. 
 30. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (involving spleen cells extracted during 
therapy used without patient’s knowledge to develop a new line of cells that 
became the object of a valuable patent). 
 31. See also Gina Kolata, Sharing of Profits Is Debated as the Value of 
Tissue Rises, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2000, at A1 (reporting cases in which people 
discovered that cell or tissue donations were used in ways beyond their 
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confidential relationship, fraud, invasion of privacy, and even 
more general notions of unfair competition may, in a given 
case, justify accepting the economic inefficiency of protecting 
traditional information. 
It is possible that the availability of patents based on 
information derived from indigenous peoples creates a perverse 
incentive for western scientists and their employers to attempt 
to gain information through nefarious means, like fraud or 
breach of confidence.  One could surely find examples of 
creative inventors who have been cheated out of the financial 
return that would have been theirs under patent law by the 
unsavory actions of others.  By providing exclusive rights, 
patent law does produce the occasional bonanza for the 
patentee, and logically the hope of such a bonanza would lead 
to at least some activity aimed at getting an unfair share of the 
prize.  Again, this is simply a normal effect of patent law, and 
property rights in general.  The existence of property rights is a 
prerequisite to theft.  Biotech patents would seem an unlikely 
candidate for supplying a special incentive in this regard, 
however, given that most inventions require a huge investment 
to convert the initial information into a commercial product 
and test it for safety and effectiveness.  Indeed, the numerous 
enclosure laws that a number of developing countries have 
adopted to maintain control over their genetic heritages may be 
driving researchers away from bioprospecting, due to the 
difficulty of identifying source material that will lead to a 
valuable product and the complexity of achieving the necessary 
consents.32  In other words, the causal link between a biotech 
patent and any assumed fraud in obtaining the underlying 
information from indigenous sources is weaker than for many 
other products.  Moreover, the vast majority of patents, biotech 
or otherwise, are the result of unobjectionable behavior.  We 
therefore return to the need to identify the behavior that is 
wrongful when information derived from indigenous sources is 
turned into a patented product and to look for an appropriate 
sanction for that behavior. 
Some commentators assert more generally that indigenous 
peoples often object to the use of their traditional knowledge on 
                                                          
expectations and the original purpose of their donations). 
 32. See Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological 
Promise: The International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 641, 657 (2004). 
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ethical grounds, arguing that intellectual property should be 
treated as a pure public good.33  No one can say that this view 
is wrong, as it comes down in the end to a question of 
fundamental values.  Still, the question remains whether any 
group following this belief should retain exclusive rights to use 
information they have discovered with respect to people outside 
the group.  If the information is freely available simply by 
visiting the group and observing their lifestyle without fraud or 
duplicity, preventing the visitor from using the information as 
the basis for creating a new and perhaps patentable product is 
equivalent to recognizing exclusive, perhaps group, rights in 
the information.  Maybe such recognition can be justified on the 
ground that the group’s culture should be respected by 
outsiders, but if this is the claim, it should be articulable in 
terms of western notions, like breach of confidence or privacy 
rights.  Something besides the rule of “we discovered it so it is 
ours” is necessary unless one takes the extreme step of 
embracing a full-fledged natural rights basis for intellectual 
property, or one simply has a preference for economic 
inefficiency over economic efficiency.34 
A related view is that patents impoverish indigenous 
cultures by creating a supply of products that displace 
traditional sources and methods, leading to a loss of 
biodiversity and, eventually, an irretrievable loss of crucial 
elements of traditional knowledge and culture.  Few would 
deny that such losses occur and represent a loss not only to the 
indigenous group but to all who, but for the displacement, 
might later have learned from such knowledge how to improve 
the physical or spiritual quality of their lives.  If preventing 
loss of indigenous culture is the goal, however, it is quite 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 122 
(1993); Melissa L. Sturges, Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human 
Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 219, 244 (1997) (asserting that developing countries view 
intellectual property as a publicly owned community asset that no single 
person should own); Whitt, supra note 10, at 252-53 (discussing a type of 
knowledge that the Maori call “tapu” and regard as sacred, believing that its 
misuse would cause the knowledge to lose its power). 
 34. Cf. Richard A. Shweder, The Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, 
Sept. 14, 2003, at 13 (reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE 
CULTURE? (2003)) (“[Brown] believes we can develop informal social norms of 
decency and respect that are responsive to the concerns of indigenous peoples 
without turning our society into a patchwork of legally empowered illiberal 
cultural enclaves.”). 
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myopic to focus attention on patents derived from traditional 
information.  Most indigenous groups do not end up being the 
source of information that leads to profitable patents.  
Moreover, even for groups that supply information leading to a 
patent, that specific information is only a small part of its 
entire cultural heritage, much of which is under threat from 
other sources like music, films, and clothing.  Indeed, to the 
extent patents inhibit technology transfer to indigenous 
cultures (due to higher prices or lack of local implementation 
know-how), they should actually impede the deleterious effects 
of the onslaught of western culture.  Eliminating patents on  
advances in biotechnology will not eliminate biotech innovation 
or the adverse effects of patented and unpatented advances in 
other fields of technology.  Needless to say, eliminating biotech 
patents will have no effect on cultural losses resulting from the 
adoption of western style music, cinema, clothing, and fast food.  
In short, the harmful influences of western lifestyle for 
indigenous cultures are serious and real.  Unfortunately, they 
will not be ameliorated by what would inevitably be minor 
adjustments to patent law, in either western countries or in 
locales of traditional cultures. 
The core of the biopiracy claim thus appears to be the 
unfair acquisition of indigenous knowledge and the absence of 
fair sharing of the profits that ultimately derive from 
developing it into a valuable product, rather than the 
availability of patents based on such knowledge.  The problem 
to be addressed then becomes one of ensuring that traditional 
information is acquired in a fair and equitable way and that 
fair compensation is paid to the group from which the 
information derives.  Possible solutions include refusing to 
enforce any patent based on unfairly acquired information, or 
conditioning patent enforcement on a court-determined fair 
sharing with the people who served as the information source.35  
These measures would not be major extensions of the doctrines 
of patent and copyright misuse under which the intellectual 
property rights owner is denied enforcement until the abuse is 
cured.36  Some developing countries have proposed amending 
TRIPS to mandate disclosure of the source of genetic resources 
                                                          
 35. I am indebted to my colleagues George Schatzki and Ralph Spritzer 
for this suggestion. 
 36. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1942); 
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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used in the invention, evidence that the country of origin had 
consented to the use of those genetic resources in the invention, 
and evidence of fair sharing of the benefits as conditions to the 
issuance of a patent.37  Another approach to limiting biopiracy 
directly under the patent law would be to eliminate the 
geographical limitations on disqualifying prior art.38  The 
important point for present purposes, however, is that without 
the patent there will be no profit out of which any 
compensation can be paid.39  Therefore, to the extent one is 
concerned about “biopiracy,” it is a mistake to focus on patent 
law as a crucial, or even an important, part of the problem. 
III. PATENTS ON GENES AND GENE PRODUCTS 
Patents on genes, especially human genes, and gene 
products (such as proteins and enzymes) raise some important 
technical issues in the interpretation of current patent law.  In 
addition, there is always the basic policy question in 
recognizing patents in such compositions of matter: whether 
the gain from affording patent protection (new products and 
processes that, but for the patent incentive, would not have 
been invented or disclosed) justifies the harm that flows from a 
government-enforced monopoly for the patent period (such as 
higher prices for products that would have been invented 
anyway and inhibitions on further research).  Finally, some 
biotechnology patents raise ethical issues of a very different 
type than patent law has faced in earlier periods. 
A. TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN GENE-RELATED PATENTS40 
1. Naturally Occurring Substances 
Analysis of biotech patent questions under U.S. law always 
                                                          
 37. See Safrin, supra note 32, at 666. 
 38. See supra note 20; Bagley, supra note 20, at 724-27. 
 39. See F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 307, 318 (2002) (noting the need to find ways, possibly through contract, 
to fairly allocate wealth generated by a patent based on access to biodiversity, 
but pointing out that without a patent system the wealth itself would be 
sacrificed). 
 40. I will address technical questions of patent law primarily by reference 
to that of the United States, which is the only patent law with which I am 
even modestly familiar.  I assume, but am willing to stand corrected, that my 
comments will apply in at least some general way to the patent laws of most 
other countries. 
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begins with Diamond v. Chakrabarty,41 in which the Supreme 
Court held that the law did not preclude patents on living 
organisms.42  The case is justifiably controversial for such a 
broad interpretation of § 101 of the Patent Act.43  For present 
purposes, however, the most important aspect of Chakrabarty 
was its express retention of the long-standing prohibition on 
the patenting of naturally occurring substances.44  Upholding 
and distinguishing an earlier case as denying a patent for 
merely discovering “some of the handiwork of nature,” 
Chakrabarty emphasized that the bioengineered 
microorganism at issue was not “a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon,” but rather a “product of human ingenuity” that 
differed markedly from anything found in nature.45 
Genes and gene products, as they exist or are created in 
the cells of living organisms, are naturally occurring 
substances.  They may be difficult to find, but we know they are 
there and that they can be found if enough effort is put into the 
project.  Therefore, one might have thought that the prohibition 
                                                          
 41.   447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 42. Id. at 313 (stating that the patentability line is “not between living 
and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, 
and human-made inventions”). 
 43. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 317.  Section 101 of the 
Patent Act allows a patent for one who “invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”  35 U.S.C. § 
101 (2000).  Living organisms do not fit easily into any of these categories.  See 
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 317.  This broad interpretation of § 
101 also conflicts with the special statutes aimed specifically at protecting 
plants.  Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000) (protecting a 
new and distinct variety of plant that is asexually reproduced); Plant Variety 
Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000) (giving patent like protection 
to sexually reproduced plants constituting a “novel variety”).  As a result of the 
Chakrabarty decision, plants are also patentable under the general Patent 
Act, a conclusion that the Court recently affirmed.  See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. 
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 129-30 (2001).  These 
interpretations of § 101 render both specific plant protection statutes largely 
extraneous.  Had Congress thought that the Patent Act covered all living 
organisms invented by man, there would have been no need for special plant 
protection statutes.  See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 313-17.  But 
see Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety 
Protection Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
105, 110-11 (2005) (arguing that the PVPA “remains a significant source of 
interest” notwithstanding J.E.M. AG Supply).  
 44. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. 
 45. Id. at 309-310 (discussing Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)); see also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 316-
17. 
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on patenting naturally occurring substances would have ruled 
out patents for genes and gene products.46  Yet, despite the 
Supreme Court’s reaffirmance of the prohibition on patenting 
naturally occurring substances, lower federal courts and the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have deviated 
substantially from this standard and further expanded patent 
coverage in the process.  In the case of genes, the discussion got 
sidetracked at an early stage into the issue of whether a raw 
gene sequence, without disclosure of the gene’s function or 
utility, could satisfy the “utility” requirement of the Patent 
Act.47  In response to arguments claiming that while inventions 
are patentable, mere discoveries (such as a particular gene) are 
not, the PTO said: 
[W]hen the inventor . . . discloses how to use the purified gene 
isolated from its natural state, the application satisfies the “utility” 
requirement. That is, where the application discloses a specific, 
substantial, and credible utility for the claimed isolated and purified 
gene, the isolated and purified gene composition may be patentable.48 
Thus, while a gene in its natural state inside the cells of a 
living organism is not patentable, anyone who isolates and 
purifies a gene, even by a perfectly routine methodology, and 
discloses an appropriate utility for it can obtain a patent on the 
                                                          
 46. While the proteins or enzymes that constitute gene products do occur 
naturally in living organisms in the form for which patents may be sought, 
genes themselves rarely do.  A typical gene as found in the DNA of a living 
organism contains both exons and introns, which are regions that, 
respectively, are and are not “expressed” in protein production through the 
process of RNA transcription.  See Dennis S. Karjala, A Legal Research 
Agenda for the Human Genome Initiative, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 129-33 
(1992).  If a gene researcher seeks to patent a DNA sequence comprised only of 
the natural gene’s exons, he would be technically correct in saying that such a 
sequence of DNA does not occur naturally and he has therefore created 
something “new.”  Excluding such DNA sequences from patentability, 
therefore, requires more than appeal to the traditional exception for “naturally 
occurring substances.”  The basis for exclusion must lie in the fact that this 
DNA sequence stands in a complementary one-to-one correspondence with the 
messenger RNA that serves as the template for protein production.  Id. at 130-
32.  The issue is whether exon-only DNA is sufficiently different from natural 
substances—the messenger RNA—to justify a patent. The substantial 
transformation test offered by Demaine and Fellmeth addresses this question 
and would deny a patent unless the new sequence shows a substantially 
different biological function from its natural forebear in the organism.  See 
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 444-45. 
 47. Section 101 of the Patent Act requires that the invention be “useful.” 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 48. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 
2001). 
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gene. 
Many commentators have decried treating the “isolated 
and purified” form of a naturally occurring substance as patent 
subject matter.49  Professors Linda Demaine and Aaron 
Fellmeth have recently supplied a thorough and convincing 
analysis criticizing the notion of product patents for such 
substances and demonstrating that such patents represent a 
substantial deviation from precedent.50  They argue that § 101 
of the Patent Act mandates “invention” rather than mere 
“discovery”51 based on the express statutory requirement that 
the object of the patent be “new” and something that arises 
                                                          
 49. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, 
21 E.I.P.R. 441, 443 (1999) (asserting that treating an isolated and purified 
form as an invention exalts form over substance); Richard A. Epstein, Property 
Rights in cDNA Sequences: A New Resident for the Public Domain, 3 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 575, 579 (1996) (arguing that granting patents to the 
discovery of cDNA tags would be like giving Madame Curie a patent for 
radium because she first isolated it from pitchblend); Abbey S. Meyers, 
“Intellectual Property at the Public- Private Divide:” A Response, 3 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 581, 581 (1996) (arguing for distinguishing between a 
discovery and an invention); Looney, supra note 9, at 264 (asserting that a 
gene unaltered by human intervention does not necessarily lose its status as 
an object of nature simply by taking it outside the body and identifying its 
function). 
 50. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19. 
 51. Section 101 provides for a patent to whomever “invents or discovers” 
patentable subject matter.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  In addition, the 
Constitution actually uses the word “discoveries” for the object of the exclusive 
rights Congress may afford to inventors: Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The PTO has latched onto the 
“discover” aspect of § 101 as a basis for gene-sequence patenting.  See Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.  With painstaking care, 
Professors Demaine and Fellmeth argue that the word “discovery” was more 
narrowly understood at the time the Constitution and the first Patent Act 
were adopted and in those contexts required some creative act by the inventor 
(“invention”) and not merely that he had “found” something.  Demaine & 
Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 367-73.  They argue further that the word 
“discovery” in the current Patent Act still requires “invention” and that 
Congress could not have intended to abrogate the requirement for human 
intellectual creativity if a patent is to be obtained.  Id. at 373-76; see also 
Jonathan King & Doreen Stabinsky, Patents on Cells, Genes, and Organisms 
Undermine the Exchange of Scientific Ideas, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 
1999, at B6, B7 (“‘Products of nature’ such as animals, plants, elements, and 
minerals could not be patented [before Chakrabarty], because they are found 
or discovered, not invented”); cf. Sturges, supra note 33, at 242 (asserting, not 
entirely correctly, that gene researchers do not create anything new but only 
indicate where a gene might lie along a naturally occurring sequence). 
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from application of human intellectual thought.52  They point 
out that the “isolated and purified” interpretation abrogates the 
requirement for “invention” and allows patents for essentially 
any alteration of a naturally occurring substance resulting in 
increased commercial or therapeutic value.53 
Professors Demaine and Fellmeth recommend a test based 
on whether the naturally occurring substance has been 
transformed to the point that a new product is created that is 
substantially different in biological function from the naturally 
occurring phenomenon.54  For biological substances this test 
requires a change in molecular structure, because biological 
function is largely if not wholly determined by molecular 
structure.  By requiring a substantial change in function, this 
test obviates resolution of the otherwise thorny problem of 
deciding whether a slight structural change (for example, 
adding or removing an extraneous atom or two) is sufficiently 
creative to deserve a patent.  If the gene or its product still 
functions as it does in nature, the new version will not be 
sufficiently creative under their test to be patentable.  A 
supplemental possibility for naturally occurring substances 
unmodified by human-initiated structural change55 would 
                                                          
 52. Section 101 requires that a patentable invention or discovery be “new” 
in addition to “useful” and to belong to a patentable class of “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  Professors 
Demaine and Fellmeth offer two pithy summaries of their complex but 
convincing argument: “When the Patent Act speaks of discoveries in the sense 
of ‘discoveries and inventions,’ it follows the historical usage of the term 
‘discoveries,’ meaning ‘inventions,’ because only inventions can be ‘new.’”  
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 370.  “[I]t is a mistake to use the word 
‘discovery’ to convey the sense of a ‘finding.’  Under traditional common law 
consistently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, a ‘discovery’ is not patentable 
subject matter unless it is an ‘invention.’”  Id. at 376.  They go on to argue that 
§ 103’s requirement of nonobviousness, measured against the prior human-
known art, embodies only part of the traditional notion of “invention,” because 
otherwise an obvious but new variation on a naturally occurring object would 
be patentable.  That the object of the patent arises from the application of 
human intellectual thought has always been inherent in the concept of 
“invention.”  Id. at 377, 390.  The long-standing, albeit unelaborated, 
requirement that a patent cover something “new”  remains in § 101 and still 
demands that creative human “invention” be involved.  Id. at 383-84. 
 53. Id. at 391.  Under this rationale for patentability, the first person to 
purify water or blood cells could have patented them.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 392. 
 55. Recall that genes themselves, in the precise form found in 
chromosomal DNA, are usually not the subject of patent claims.  See supra 
note 46.  However, the supplemental test that denies product patents to truly 
naturally occurring substances may simplify the patentability question for 
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simply be to state expressly that only process patents covering 
new and nonobvious uses of the now isolated and purified 
substance that occurs in nature will be available.56   
 Either approach would leave the substance itself, purified 
or not, free for research and uses not envisioned by the patent 
owner.57  Finding a new use for such substances may well 
involve substantial investment and require the incentive of 
patent protection.58  Process patents are generally considered 
weaker than product patents because it is often possible to 
invent around a process patent.  Process patents may also be 
more difficult to enforce when the process is used in another 
country and the resulting product, which is not covered by the 
patent, is imported.59  Still, at least some biotech method 
patents have a very high economic value.60  Moreover, if a 
                                                          
proteins and other gene products.  For them, only process patents would be 
available, obviating any need to argue over whether the claimed new use in 
fact involved a substantially different function. 
 56. This suggestion was made to, but rejected by, the PTO.  See Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.  The PTO’s response was 
simply that “[p]atent law provides no basis for treating DNA differently from 
other chemical compounds that are compositions of matter.”  Id.  This, of 
course, is completely erroneous, insofar as naturally occurring sequences of 
DNA are concerned.  Technically, a naturally occurring DNA sequence is 
usually not patented in the form it is found in nature.  See supra note 46.  
However, the basis for distinguishing them from patentable compositions of 
matter is that they are not “inventions,” because their composition is not the 
result of any creative human input.  See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying 
text.  The PTO expressly rejects the notion that naturally occurring 
compositions of matter, if they are isolated and purified, are ineligible for 
patents.  See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1092-93. 
 57. A product patent covers all uses of the product, whether or not 
disclosed in the patent.  See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 
1095; Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 418.  It also goes without saying 
that new and nonobvious processes for obtaining, isolating, or purifying genes 
and gene products should be patentable.  See Matthew Erramouspe, 
Comment, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and 
Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961, 997 (1996). 
 58. See Sturges, supra note 33, at 255 & n.203. 
 59. See, e.g., Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 428-29 & n.550. 
 60. See, e.g., Goldie Blumenstyk, Coalition Seeks to Make Agricultural-
Biotechnology Tools More Widely Available, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 11, 
2003, available at http://chronicle.com/daily/2003/07/2003071105n.htm 
(describing the difficulties of using, even for public or humanitarian purposes, 
fundamental genetic engineering techniques that were invented at 
universities but are now exclusively licensed to commercial operations); Eliot 
Marshall, Depth Charges Aimed at Columbia’s ‘Submarine Patent,’ 301 
SCIENCE 448 (2003) (describing Columbia University’s patent on a technique 
for inserting genes into a cell as having netted “hundreds of millions of 
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purified gene or gene product is used in a specific therapeutic 
method, there may be no readily available substitute, so the 
method-patent owner would maintain exclusive rights to that 
use.61 
In any event, while U.S. law has deviated from its long-
standing position that naturally occurring substances are 
unpatentable and that merely extracting them in purified form 
does not make them patentable, other nations are free to argue 
that such substances are not patentable because they are not 
“new.”  TRIPS requires patents only for inventions that are 
“new,” and member states may decide for themselves whether 
or not a naturally occurring substance, like a gene or gene 
product, is “new” in the sense required by their patent 
statutes.62 
2. Modified Genes and Their Products 
Many biotech inventions will involve creative alteration of 
a naturally occurring substance.  In such cases, an objection to 
patenting based on the absence of something “new,” in the 
                                                          
dollars”). 
 61. A more substantial objection to method patents for new and 
nonobvious uses of genes and gene products derives from the TRIPS rule that 
permits excluding from patentability “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals.”  TRIPS, supra note 3, at 
art. 27(3)(a).  Much of Europe and many other countries have availed 
themselves of this exclusionary possibility.  E.g., Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5 1973, art. 54(4),  
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/.  The United States does not preclude patents on 
therapeutic processes, but it does immunize “medical practitioners” from 
liability for infringement arising in the course of performing a “medical 
activity.”  35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).  Among other exclusions, however, the 
immunity does not apply to infringements arising from practicing a process “in 
violation of a biotechnology patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).  This would 
seem to leave unimpaired, in the United States at any rate, a patented method 
for using a naturally occurring substance derived through biotechnology.  In 
any event, whether and to what extent therapeutic methods should be 
protected under patent law involves fundamental policy issues.  If patent law 
today, under the TRIPS permissive exclusion, supplies insufficient protection 
to therapeutic methods, that aspect of it should be amended.  It is not a 
satisfactory solution to make an end-run around the current spate of 
exclusions for therapeutic methods by protecting naturally occurring 
substances as products.  I am indebted to my former student Fariba Sirjani for 
making me aware of § 287(c) and the alternative approaches to limiting 
therapeutic-method patents elsewhere. 
 62. Moreover, merely finding raw genes is not particularly difficult or 
inventive.  See Erramouspe, supra note 57, at 997.  Consequently, denial of 
patents on raw genes could also be predicated on absence of an inventive step. 
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sense of “not previously existing,” is unavailable.  Similarly, an 
objection based on the absence of sufficient human creativity in 
the final product is often unavailable.  Consequently, if a 
product, like the microorganism in Chakrabarty, otherwise 
meets the requirements for a patent, such as the technical 
standards for novelty and the substantive standards for 
nonobviousness, there are no grounds in the Patent Act itself 
for denying a patent.63  TRIPS, of course, allows excluding 
plants and animals, other than microorganisms, from 
patentability,64 and many countries may choose to so act on 
ethical grounds.  Nevertheless, the absence of patent protection 
for genomic innovations does not ensure that no products based 
on modified genes or gene products will appear.  Moreover, 
recognition of patents in this area does not mean that there can 
be no regulation or even outright prohibition by specific 
legislation.65  Additionally, we should bear in mind the huge 
potential for genetically modified organisms to contribute to the 
elimination of hunger and disease in developing countries, 
particularly if access to the technology is available.66  If patents 
on such products, at least in developed countries, serve as an 
incentive for their creation, then outright denial of patent 
rights would appear to affect a net social loss. 
B. POLICY BALANCING OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GENE-
RELATED PATENTS 
1. Naturally Occurring Substances 
The courts and PTO have expanded the notion of patent 
subject matter to include patents on gene sequences or 
naturally occurring gene products, provided that they have 
been “isolated and purified.”  Thus, until the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 63. See generally Arti K. Rai, Patenting Human Organisms: An Ethical 
and Legal Analysis (draft paper prepared for President’s Council on Bioethics, 
June 21, 2002),  available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/akrai/rai.patents.cob.doc. 
 64. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 27(3)(b).  Professor Fellmeth has pointed 
out to me that Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS may soon be ineffective as a result of 
bilateral free trade agreements between the United States and many other 
countries, especially in the western hemisphere.  These agreements require 
protection generally equivalent to that available in the United States after 
Chakrabarty. 
 65. See generally Rai, supra note 63. 
 66. See Kowalski, supra note 27, at 42-45. 
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addresses the issue, we must accept the patentability of gene 
sequences and naturally occurring gene products, whether or 
not this conflicts with the earlier prohibition on patenting 
naturally occurring substances.  It remains important to ask 
whether this expansion of traditional patent law makes sense 
as a matter of policy. 
Professor Richard Epstein has articulated the basic policy 
issue that must be addressed in deciding whether to recognize 
gene-related patents: do the incentives for creation of these 
inventions justify the restrictions on output that follow from 
exclusive rights?67  Few, if any, have argued on economic 
grounds that gene-related patents should be wholly proscribed.  
But many able commentators have argued cogently that 
patents on raw gene sequences could inhibit, rather than 
promote, the progress of science and the development of 
products that are actually useful.68  Gene sequences alone, even 
in their “isolated and purified” forms, rarely have any direct 
use outside the organisms from which they derive and are 
naturally used.  Useful products are normally the result of 
implanting the gene into the genome of an organism, such as a 
bacterium, that will then manufacture the protein or enzyme 
encoded by the gene.  Then that protein or enzyme must be 
extracted from the cellular environment in which it was 
produced by the “vector” organism (such as the bacterium) and 
ultimately tested for safety and efficacy in its hypothesized use.  
These “downstream” activities that go from the gene itself to a 
useful product may require a greater investment of time and 
money than the “upstream” effort needed to determine the gene 
in the first place.69  Thus, patents on basic upstream tools can 
inhibit rather than promote valuable downstream research.70  
                                                          
 67. Epstein, supra note 49, at 577-78 (arguing against patentability for 
the discovery of cDNA sequences, equating it to giving the first person to 
capture a fox an exclusive right to all foxes—an analogy that admittedly 
conflates physical and informational resources). 
     68.   See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
 69. Opinion, Genes and Patent Law, 371 NATURE 270 (1994) (stating that 
the effort spent on gene identification is likely to be much smaller than that 
required to work out their normal function, which will be the basis for 
discovering means of treatment and prevention of disease). 
 70. See John H. Barton, Patent Scope in Biotechnology, 26 IIC 605, 614 
(1995) (“[H]ighly basic patents that preempt a large area of research are 
unlikely to be beneficial.”); David Dickson, HUGO and HGS Clash over 
“Utility” of Gene Sequences in US Patent Law, 374 NATURE 751 (1995) 
(describing Human Genome Organization (HUGO) officials’ opposition to 
patents on cDNA sequences because they are “routine discoveries” that could 
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Professors Demaine and Fellmeth point out that when an 
upstream patent lacks ingenuity (which is the case for 
naturally occurring gene sequences), the patent incentive may 
not be necessary to induce innovation but may still be strongly 
preclusive of downstream research.71 
It has also been argued that patents on raw genes may 
result both in too much investment in the search for genes and 
in insufficient investment in developing new products and 
carrying them to market.72  In addition, such patents can 
inhibit information flow, which in turn results in duplicative 
research.73  Finally, Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg have argued that gene sequence patents can lead to 
a “tragedy of the anticommons,” in which many overlapping 
claims to gene fragments or “stacked” rights established by 
reach-through license agreements74 between upstream 
patentees and downstream researchers must be coordinated to 
develop a useful product.  Too many such claims may make 
negotiations among all affected parties difficult or impossible.75  
Moreover, a biotech anticommons is more likely to endure than 
in other areas of intellectual property because of higher 
transaction costs, heterogeneous interests among owners, and 
                                                          
inhibit incentives to establish gene function or develop applications); Epstein, 
supra note 49, at 578 (decrying cDNA patents as opposed to patents for the 
fashioning of some new bacterium or virus with commercial applications); 
Melissa E. Horn, Note, DNA Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the 
Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 263-64, 274-76 
(2003). 
 71. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 417-18. 
 72. See, e.g., Drahos, supra note 49, at 443; Amy E. Carroll, Comment, 
Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. 
Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2482 (1995). 
 73. See Carroll, supra note 72, at 2483-84; see also Chapman, supra note 
9, at 7, 24-25.  But see Looney, supra note 9, at 244-45 (concluding that the 
impact of gene patenting on the dissemination of information is unclear). 
 74. See Eliot Marshall, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here . . . , 278 SCIENCE 
212 (1997) (describing the complex bureaucratic web resulting from general 
implementation of “materials transfer agreements” requiring the surrender of 
property rights in subsequent discoveries in exchange for materials intended 
for research use). 
 75. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699-
700 (1998); see also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 419-21 (noting that 
“multiple patentable sequences (ESTs, codons, SNPs, etc.) can originate in the 
same gene, resulting in upstream patentees owning rights to different parts of 
the same gene”); Horn, supra note 70, at 265-67. 
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cognitive biases of researchers.76 
These policy arguments suggest that it was a mistake for 
U.S. law to deviate from its traditional refusal to protect 
naturally occurring substances, even though purified, in the 
case of gene sequences.77  Like the argument against such 
patenting based on the absence of “invention” or “newness,” 
however, nothing in it suggests differential treatment of 
indigenous peoples from anyone else.  If patenting genes or 
gene products is wrong on either statutory or policy grounds, 
we should correct the law, not because it imposes a particular 
burden on indigenous peoples but because it imposes an 
unreasonable burden on everyone.78 
2. Modified Genes and Their Products 
In the cases of human-created DNA sequences that do not 
occur naturally and products derived from such sequences, we 
can no longer say, in general, that there is no “invention” or 
that the invention is not “new.”  Such inventions, like the 
bacterium at issue in Chakrabarty, have much potential for 
ameliorating some of humankind’s worst afflictions.  Whether 
and to what extent patents supply the necessary incentive to 
undertake the research leading to such inventions is, as with 
all inventions, a difficult and unresolved question.  However, I 
see no reason to distinguish these genomic inventions from any 
other on this score. 
                                                          
 76. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 75, at 700-01; see also Dan L. Burk 
& Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERK. TECH. L.J. 
1155, 1195-96 (2002) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s application of a 
stringent disclosure requirement and a lax nonobviousness requirement to 
biotech inventions exacerbates the anticommons problem by resulting in a 
multitude of narrow upstream patents that can strangle downstream product 
development). 
 77. See Horn, supra note 70, at 281-82 (arguing for legislation providing 
compulsory licensing at reasonable cost for gene patents and suggesting an 
infringement exemption for those who use patented genes to develop products 
more medically useful).  But see F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science - A Response to Rai and 
Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001) (criticizing generally the arguments 
of Professors Rai and Eisenberg against patents on basic biotechnological 
inventions, but not specifically attacking these arguments as applied to 
naturally occurring substances like genes or gene products). 
 78. Cf. Kieff, supra note 77, at 704 (concluding that patent availability for 
basic biotechnological inventions increases the funds available for research 
and commercialization and will more likely promote traditional scientific 
norms, such as independence and objectivity, than would be observed in a 
world without such patents). 
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C. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM GENE-RELATED PATENTS 
Patents confer upon their owners the right to exclude all 
others from making, selling, or using the patented invention.  
Thus, patents covering genes of living organisms, particularly 
patents covering pieces of the human genome, raise several 
ethical questions:  First, whether such private control over 
genes or their products involves monopolization of the “common 
heritage of mankind.”79  Second, whether they denigrate 
human life by reducing life to a commodity.  Third, whether 
they interfere with individual or collective privacy.  Fourth, 
whether they promote distributive justice when they are 
concentrated in a few economically developed countries.80  And 
fifth, whether patents on crop varieties threaten biodiversity.81  
These are serious issues that will continue to be addressed for 
some time.  I only touch upon them here because, as for the 
technical and policy bases for gene-related patents, indigenous 
and nonindigenous populations are equally affected or, where 
there are differences in how costs or benefits deriving from 
gene-related patents are distributed, analysis shows that it is 
not the patent that is at the root of the problem. 
1. Monopolizing the “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
We should first note that any objection to gene-related 
patents as monopolizing the “common heritage of mankind” 
must in fact refer only to patents on human genes.  This is 
inherent in the term “mankind.”  If all living things were 
deemed part of the “common heritage of mankind,” there could 
be no property rights at all, let alone patent rights, in domestic 
animals or even plants.  This objection to human gene-related 
patents would seem to be subsumed in the “naturally occurring 
substance” controversy.82  If we upheld the traditional ban on 
patents covering naturally occurring substances, whether or 
                                                          
 79. See, e.g., Sturges, supra note 33. 
 80. See Looney, supra note 9, at 240. 
 81. CENTER FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, THE 1999 WTO REVIEW OF LIFE 
PATENTING UNDER TRIPS 4 [hereinafter CIEL REPORT], 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/WTOReviewofLPunderTRIPS.pdf . 
 82. Cf. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 
2001) (noting objections to gene patents on the ground that the human genome 
is at the core of what it means to be human, which the PTO lumped with 
comments objecting to patents for discoveries in nature rather than 
inventions). 
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not isolated and purified, human genes and their protein 
products would not be patentable. 
The substantial transformation test of Professors Demaine 
and Fellmeth should, as a practical matter, get to the same 
result.  That test would allow a product patent on genes, 
including human genes, biochemicals, or tissues, that are so 
substantially transformed from their natural state that they 
perform a different biological function than they do naturally.  
Thus, anything taken out of the “common heritage” would have 
to be so changed from its natural state that a patent could not 
be used to control its natural use.83  Effectively, the substantial 
transformation test they recommend for patentability should 
mean that no composition-of-matter patents would issue on 
naturally occurring genes or their products, because to perform 
a different biological function the substances almost certainly 
will have to have a different structure.84  Their test is thus one 
of the degree of “inventiveness” an applicant must show to get a 
patent on a composition of matter that he has modified from its 
natural form, which takes the invention out of the “common 
heritage” and places it with all other patented inventions.  This 
test does seem to leave the theoretical issue of whether a 
composition-of-matter patent could issue on a naturally 
occurring substance that has been isolated and purified and 
found to perform not only its natural function but also a 
completely different biological function.  In this purely 
theoretical case, there remains a danger of control over its 
natural use.  Product patents give rights to make, use, or sell 
the product, covering even uses not disclosed in the patent 
application.85  Limiting protection to a method patent covering 
only the use of the isolated and purified substance in a specific 
therapy would avoid even this theoretical objection.  Expressly 
restricting naturally occurring substances to method patents 
would not in any way preclude application of the substantial 
transformation test to substances that are structurally 
transformed.  Indeed, that test is then vital in determining 
whether the applicant has truly “invented” something new or 
has simply made minor modifications of nature’s handiwork. 
Still, even though standard doctrine fairly applied can deal 
with the “common heritage” objection, as a policy matter it is at 
                                                          
 83. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 444-45. 
 84. See supra note 46. 
 85. See supra note 57. 
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least possible that a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis might 
show gains from recognizing patents in genes and their 
products outweighing losses therefrom.  That is, patents may 
actually serve as an incentive to discover these products and 
their desirable uses to such an extent that the disadvantages of 
temporarily higher pricing and reduced information flow should 
be accepted.  If we assume for the moment that this is in fact 
the case, we must deal with the claim that human gene-related 
patents should be denied notwithstanding their economic 
advantages, because they would amount to undesirable 
monopolies on the common heritage of mankind. 
This claim is most potent if a patent on a human gene or 
its protein product were construed to cover the naturally 
occurring processes that take place within human cells, where 
the gene itself resides and causes the manufacture of its 
protein product.  Literally, the cell, and thus the human being 
to whom the cell belongs, is “making” the gene every time the 
cell divides, and the cell “uses” the gene in the process of 
“making” the gene product.  Thus, it would appear that a 
patent covering the gene or its product would be infringed by 
these natural activities.86  Although the patent only issues 
upon the applicant’s claim that the product has been “isolated 
and purified” from its natural form, once issued the product (or 
composition-of-matter) patent covers any use of the chemical 
composition.  A patent on a new drug, for example, will cover 
any form of chemical packaging into which the drug is 
incorporated or mixed.  If it did not, the patent would be 
worthless.  The logic of composition-of-matter patents on 
naturally occurring genes and their products thus leads to an 
absurd result when applied to living organisms and represents 
a basic flaw in the theory.87 
                                                          
 86. See, e.g., Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 434 (“From a purely 
positivistic perspective, a patent on a DNA molecule or protein entitles the 
patentee to forbid cell building, transcripting, and reproducing by any 
individual whose genome contains that DNA molecule or uses that protein, as 
such activities constitute using and making unauthorized copies of the DNA 
molecule or protein.”). 
 87. See id. at 435.  While no court will be led to find infringement based 
on the natural operations of living organisms that have been taking place for 
eons, Professors Demaine and Fellmeth point to other examples that may be 
closer to reality.  A patient whose cells have been patented, for example, would 
be prohibited from donating or selling blood or gametes without a license from 
the patentee.  Id. at 436. 
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The problem arises, however, not because genes are part of 
the common heritage of mankind but rather because gene and 
gene-product patents, by their nature, cover things that are not 
“inventions.”  One can imagine someone or some group whose 
cells contain a unique mutation in a particular gene that gives 
the gene some special value.  It is not part of the “common 
heritage of mankind” because, by hypothesis, at most a limited 
group carries the gene.  Moreover, by limiting focus on human 
genes, the common heritage approach would leave naturally 
occurring genes in other plants and animals free to be taken 
and patented.  Therefore, it would seem that opposing gene 
patents on the ground that genes comprise the common 
heritage of mankind is not fruitful analytically.  Instead, we 
should stay within the bounds of traditional patent law and 
seek denial of patents on the ground that patents on naturally 
occurring genes and gene products give a theoretical monopoly 
over the life processes of the organisms from which they derive.  
Such a monopoly, even though apparently more theoretical 
than practical at the moment, is simply unacceptable, 
regardless of the economic cost/benefit analysis. 
 Some variations of the “universal heritage” argument are 
also possible.88  Some might argue, for example, that a gene is 
still part of the common heritage of mankind even though only 
a limited group carries it.  The underlying principle would be 
that a gene is nature’s, or God’s, handiwork and cannot 
therefore be legally owned or monopolized by anyone other 
than the whole of humankind.  One can get to this same result 
much more mundanely, but analytically more cleanly, by 
reactivating the traditional rule against the patenting of 
naturally occurring substances.  Moreover, insofar as the 
argument is based on not monopolizing something created by 
God or nature, it still leaves open the question of whether and 
when patents should be available for structurally modified 
products of nature.  For that determination we need something 
like the substantial transformation test of Professors Demaine 
and Fellmeth discussed above.  Another argument might be 
that genes are not just physical products but constitute 
information about nature, and that such information should 
not be monopolized.  This, however, is at bottom an attack on 
all of intellectual property law, because monopolization of 
                                                          
 88. I am indebted to Professor Aaron Fellmeth for the arguments 
discussed in this paragraph. 
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information is precisely what patent and copyright laws do.  
Every invention carries with it information about the operation 
of nature, because technology works by natural laws.  
Consequently, the “information about nature” argument is not 
easily limited to genes and gene products. 
 It might be noted that the Biodiversity Convention 
requires that member states facilitate access to genetic 
resources, subject to fair sharing of the benefits after genetic 
resources have been obtained by prior informed consent.89  It 
thus rejects any form of the “common heritage” doctrine that 
would prevent all forms of commercialization.90  Similarly, 
Article 4 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights declares that the human genome in its 
natural state shall not give rise to financial gains.91  This too 
seems to allow commercialization of the human genome outside 
its “natural state,” which would presumably include its 
“isolated and purified” form.  This goes well beyond what would 
be permitted by traditional patent law under the exception for 
naturally occurring substances. 
In any event, and of most relevance for the present topic, 
nothing in the “common heritage” argument distinguishes 
indigenous from nonindigenous peoples.  If it is bad for 
indigenous peoples that anyone should get a patent in a piece of 
the “common heritage of mankind,” it is equally bad for 
everyone else. 
2. Reduction of Life to a Commodity 
Many maintain that patents on pieces of the human 
genome are morally wrong because they reduce life to a 
commodity.92  While this argument has a certain rhetorical 
ring, its high level of generality renders analytical application 
difficult.  A patent on a gene that is useful for diagnosing 
                                                          
 89. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, arts. 
15(2), 15(4), 15(5), 15(7), 31 I.L.M. 818, 828. 
 90. See David R. Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade: 
Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Intellectual Property in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 4 TOURO J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9 (1993). 
 91. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, art. 
4 UNESCO Gen. Conference (Nov. 11, 1997), adopted by G.A. Res. 152, U.N. 
GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (1999) [hereinafter Universal 
Declaration]. 
 92. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 9, at 3; Sturges, supra note 33, at 242, 
244-45; CIEL REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. 
KARJALA_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:28:01 PM 
2006] BIOTECH PATENTS & INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 515 
potential disease may mean that anyone who wishes to undergo 
the genetic test will have to pay more than if the gene were in 
the public domain.  It is not clear to me, however, how this 
commodifies human life any more than a patent on any other 
medical diagnosis device or procedure.  While at bottom it may 
come down to questions of fundamental ethical or religious 
values, to me no single gene or gene product can be 
meaningfully deemed “human life.”  A product is “commodified” 
when it becomes the subject of market transactions—it is 
widely available, like aspirin, against payment of the purchase 
price.  It is easy to imagine markets in unpatented products 
based on human genes, and such products, like aspirin, will be 
commodities.  They are no less commodities if they were never 
subject to a patent, or if the patent has expired, than they are 
while under patent.  Moreover, the unavailability of patents 
will not stop scientific activity on human genes nor will it stop 
all market activity in gene products.93  Conversely, the 
availability of patents is not synonymous with 
commodification.94 
Finally, it is again unclear how making and selling a 
product based on a human gene differentially affects 
indigenous and nonindigenous peoples.  It may be more likely 
that an indigenous group relatively isolated from the onslaught 
of modern society will have in its collective genome a genetic 
characteristic of particular interest to those who seek to 
develop genes into patentable products.95  In addition, remote, 
isolated populations often make it is easier to trace disease 
heredity, which means that studying the genes from these 
groups can speed up gene discovery and drug development.96  
Yet, it is difficult to see how studying the genetic characteristic 
                                                          
 93. See George Poste, The Case for Genomic Patenting, 378 NATURE 534, 
536 (1995); Rai, supra note 63. 
 94. See Rai, supra note 63. 
 95. Cf. Neil Gross & John Carey, Who Owns the Tree of Life?, BUS. WK., 
Nov. 4, 1996, at 194 (describing the Papua New Guinea Hagahai’s apparent 
immunity to a virus that usually causes leukemia); King & Stabinsky, supra 
note 51 (describing patent applications for cells and genes of New Guinea 
tribes because of an apparent immunity against certain viruses); John Frow, 
Elvis’ Fame: The Commodity Form and the Form of the Person, 7 CARDOZO 
STUD. L. & LIT. 131, 150 (1995) (describing applications for patents on the cells 
of individuals from Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, each of them 
carriers without apparent harm of the HTLV-I virus). 
 96. See Gross & Carey, supra note 95, at 197; Safrin, supra note 32, at 
660-61 (stating that DNA from homogeneous and isolated populations can 
facilitate discovery of disease-causing genes). 
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of interest reduces the lives of the people from whom the 
information is derived to a commodity.  More often, the 
complaint is that these people should be able to benefit from 
any profits that are eventually derived from the results of such 
studies, which is simply the human genome variant of the more 
general biopiracy problem discussed above with respect to 
nonhuman resources.  Indeed, if it is true that the benefits of 
developments in modern medicine are slow to reach many 
indigenous societies, it is difficult to see how “commodification” 
in developed countries affects them at all. 
3. Privacy and Human Dignity 
Many have decried recognition of gene-related patents as 
being fundamentally in conflict with norms of privacy and 
human dignity.97  The underlying notion seems to stem from 
the intimate relation between an individual’s genes and his or 
her phenotype, as expressed in physical, intellectual, and 
emotional characteristics.98  Because genes are also part of our 
collective makeup, it has been suggested that gene patenting 
may violate some sort of collective privacy right as well.99 
At the individual level, there is no doubt that knowledge of 
someone’s genome, in particular the presence of specific genes 
known to have a causal relationship to a particular disease, can 
be put to unfair discriminatory use in areas like employment or 
insurance.100  To the extent that such a gene is known to be 
differentially preponderant in a specific group, the danger of 
group stigma is also very real.  Without downplaying the 
importance of either of these problems, it is difficult to see how 
gene-related patents exacerbate them.  Genomic research has 
been going on for some time and is not likely to stop, regardless 
of the availability of patents.  Indeed, it is the identification of 
the gene and its function that sets the stage for any subsequent 
discrimination that may occur, individual or collective.  One of 
the major policy arguments against patenting such naturally 
occurring substances is that patents are not necessary as an 
incentive for this kind of research.  There is good reason to 
                                                          
 97. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 437-38 (discussing the 
worldwide concern about these issues). 
 98. See Looney, supra note 9, at 238. 
 99. See id. at 238-39. 
 100. See generally Karjala, supra note 46. 
KARJALA_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:28:01 PM 
2006] BIOTECH PATENTS & INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 517 
hope that much of this research, even when it identifies a 
particular set of genes with a given generally undesirable 
phenotypical response, such as a disease, will ultimately lead to 
valuable therapeutic interventions or methods of prevention.  
Withdrawal of the patent incentive will almost surely be 
detrimental for these developments. 
Interference with privacy norms and affronts to human 
dignity through misuse of the results of genomic research 
would also seem to be at least as problematic for people in 
developed countries as it is for indigenous peoples.  The worst 
case scenario for indigenous peoples might be the finding of a 
gene specific to a particular group that plays a causal role in 
some undesirable phenotypical attribute (as viewed from 
outside the group).  Such a discovery could unfairly stigmatize 
the group in the eyes of outsiders.  Patents, however, would 
seem particularly unrelated to such a discovery.  When 
outsiders have sought patents based on the genetic makeup of 
an indigenous group, it is usually because the group is 
perceived as having a genetic advantage over the rest of 
humankind.101  By the nature of the patent incentive, it is 
unlikely that patent would encourage anyone to look for a gene 
causing what is perceived in developed countries as a 
disadvantage that is unknown in those countries. 
4. Crop Monocultures and Monopolization of Crop Genomes 
Some have raised ethical questions concerning the 
appropriateness of gene patents, even outside the human 
genome.  Patents on crop varieties, for example, may result in 
monocultures and the use of expensive inputs, such as 
fertilizers, that cause environmental harm.102  It has been 
claimed that broad plant variety patents have conferred on a 
few corporations virtual monopolies on the genomes of 
important crops.103 
Here we again find some potentially serious problems.  If 
all the world’s wheat is a single variety, and if that variety 
turns out to be susceptible to a rapidly spreading blight of some 
sort, a significant portion of the world’s food supply could be 
                                                          
 101. See supra note 95 (describing attempts to patent cells and genes of 
indigenous groups based on an apparent immunity to diseases that afflict 
developed countries). 
 102. See CIEL REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. 
 103. See Chapman, supra note 9, at 22. 
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wiped out with catastrophic consequences.104  Still, one can 
legitimately question the role patents might play in creating or 
exacerbating these problems.  If the use of expensive inputs is 
the problem, it would seem that the patented variety would not 
be used by everyone (in particular, by those who cannot afford 
to pay).  It should be borne in mind that a patent on a crop 
variety obligates no one to buy the seed.  All farmers are free to 
continue using their traditional varieties in their traditional 
ways.  Patent can serve as an incentive for finding or 
commercializing environmentally friendly crops and other 
inventions, and the existence of a patent can reduce resort by 
the distributor to economically inefficient and perhaps 
environmentally dangerous self-help approaches.105 
Moreover, if environmental harm is the problem (and a 
susceptible monoculture is one such example), environmental 
regulation is most likely necessary to remedy it.106  Because of 
the human tendency toward free riding, no one can be expected 
to adopt an environmentally friendly approach to food 
production without the assurance that his competitors are 
operating under the same (economic) disadvantage.  If a given 
but advantageous variety is unpatented, it is likely to be 
adopted even more widely than if it is patented, increasing the 
danger of dependence on a monoculture. 
IV. PATENTS GENERALLY AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Any country that wishes to have the free trade advantages 
supposedly supplied by the World Trade Organization must 
comply with the intellectual property requirements of TRIPS.  
Among other things, TRIPS mandates that its member states 
                                                          
 104. The Irish potato blight is a classic example, as is the commercial 
banana today, which may be under serious threat.  Jim Chen, Webs of Life: 
Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
495, 506 (2004). 
 105. See Kieff, supra note 39, at 318-19 (arguing that a patent can obviate 
the perceived need of the innovator of a new and valuable seed to use 
potentially dangerous technologies to protect against competitive sale of seed 
by initial purchasers). 
 106. See id. at 318 (arguing that where new technologies are harmful to 
environmental goals, the existence of a patent at least does not exacerbate the 
harm, because patent’s right to exclude does not provide an affirmative right 
to use the technology by the patentee, so such use can be regulated or 
prohibited). 
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adopt patent laws similar to the models of the developed 
nations of the United States and the European Union.  Many 
commentators have argued that developing countries have 
little to gain from recognizing foreign patents, as required by 
TRIPS, except to avoid trade retaliation.107  A hefty debate 
continues over whether patent laws promote or inhibit 
technology transfer to developing countries.  That, in turn, 
raises the question of whether the costs of establishing a patent 
system, largely for the benefit of developed countries, are 
outweighed by the benefits.  In addition, some commentators 
have raised ethical and human rights issues outside the specific 
realm of biotechnology.  These include issues of distributive 
justice108 and access to pharmaceuticals.109  Others have 
asserted that developing countries may view intellectual 
property as a community (public domain) asset that no 
individual should own.110  Patenting, in particular, has been 
said to clash with indigenous knowledge and value systems.111 
A. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There is little doubt that TRIPS impedes the ability of 
developing countries to determine their intellectual property 
standards and policies in the hope of achieving a better fit to 
their own economic and social conditions.112  In particular, it 
does not allow the choice of simply not recognizing patents for 
inventions by nationals of other member states.113  At the same 
time, the advantages to developing countries of adopting and 
enforcing a patent law have been seriously questioned. 
It has been claimed that recognizing patents induces 
technology transfer, allowing the patenting country to gain not 
                                                          
 107. See Carroll, supra note 72, at 2471 (citing EDITH T. PENROSE, THE 
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 116-17 (1951)). 
 108. See Looney, supra note 9, at 239-40. 
 109. See Lazzarini, supra note 12, at 115-19 (arguing that access to 
pharmaceuticals should be thought of as a human right). 
 110. See Sturges, supra note 33, at 244. 
 111. See Whitt, supra note 10, at 240. 
 112. See Chapman, supra note 9, at 6-7; cf. Carroll, supra note 72, at 2466-
67 (stating that forcing countries to adopt patent laws and accept conditions of 
technology transfer laid down by the holder of the patent is “technological 
colonialism”). 
 113. See Howard C. Anawalt, International Intellectual Property, Progress, 
and the Rule of Law, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 383, 404 
(2003) (“The linkage of WTO membership to mandatory intellectual property 
rights and procedure should be ended . . . .”). 
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only the knowledge supplied in patent applications themselves, 
but also the necessary know-how to start going into many of 
these fields of technology.  Others have disputed these claims, 
arguing that foreign patents impede developing countries’ 
ability to appropriate new technologies and products.114  The 
needs of developing countries are often quite basic and some 
lack the ability to assimilate the latest technologies.115  A 
foreign patent owner may have little incentive to transfer 
technological knowledge related to a patented invention if 
profits are available from imports.116  Most obviously, the 
information contained in a patent application is always 
available in the developed countries in which the invention is 
patented.  Therefore, if a developing country is indeed capable 
of making use of such information in local industry, it would 
have access to the information without having its own patent 
law, and its citizens could make use of the information sooner, 
or at least without having to license it.117 
B. ACCESS TO INVENTIONS 
It is routinely observed that patented goods reaching the 
market will have a higher price than if they were not 
patented.118  To the extent this is true, it reduces access to the 
patented goods if there is any elasticity in demand because 
people at the margin, by definition, may afford a lower price 
but not a higher one.  It has been argued, moreover, that a 
                                                          
 114. See Gutterman, supra note 33, at 122-23, 136-37 (1993); cf. Downes, 
supra note 90, at 22-23; Lazzarini, supra note 12, at 111 (both concluding that 
the empirical evidence on the inhibiting or beneficial effects of intellectual 
property rights on technology transfer is scanty); Seeratan, supra note 14, at 
383 (noting that industrialized countries did not adopt strong intellectual 
property laws until they themselves had reaped the benefits of 
nonprotectionist policies).  Even within the United States there is much 
anecdotal evidence that recent advances in medicine do not reach many of 
those who need it or their physicians, often years after the information is 
publicly available.  E.g., Sharon Begley, Too Many Patients Never Reap 
Benefits of Great Research, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at B1. 
 115. See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third 
World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 843. 
 116. See id. at 852. 
 117. See id. at 850. 
 118. See Carroll, supra note 72, at 2468;  Chapman, supra note 9, at 21; 
Seeratan, supra note 14, at 375 (asserting that the TRIPS requirement for 
both product and process patents will substantially increase the cost of 
pharmaceuticals). 
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patent owner might choose not to enter a market and not to 
authorize local production, thereby reducing access in that 
country.119  One might question why a patent owner would 
adopt this strategy.  It would seem that if he is unwilling to 
import into a given country, he would be better off economically 
by licensing local production.  One possible explanation is fear 
of gray market “leakage” that is difficult to control by contract.  
But even this explanation is unsatisfying because under 
TRIPS, if the country has the local ability to manufacture the 
invention, it may grant a compulsory license.120  Of course, any 
such compulsory license is supposed to be primarily for local 
consumption.121  However, if gray market leakage is a problem 
under a negotiated license where the patentee has direct 
contact with the licensee, it would seem to be an even bigger 
problem under a compulsory license. 
Probably the most convincing argument against patent 
laws in developing countries is Professor Samuel Oddi’s 
observation that few inventions are “patent-induced” with 
respect to a given developing country.122  That is, most 
inventions likely would have been invented anyway, regardless 
of whether any given developing country has a patent law that 
might protect it.  To the extent that an invention is not patent-
induced, a patent on it necessarily adds to that country’s costs 
because, even without recognizing the patent, the developing 
country has access to the information contained in the 
developed-country filings.123 
C. BALANCING COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PATENT LAW 
The above analysis implies that patents in developing 
countries can add significantly to those countries’ costs with 
respect to new inventions.124  This cost is likely not offset by an 
                                                          
 119. See Gutterman, supra note 33, at 122-23. 
 120. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 31. 
 121. Id. at art. 31(f). 
 122. Oddi, supra note 115, at 844; see also Seeratan, supra note 14, at 386 
(“None of the pharmaceutical companies really depend on achieving profits in 
developing countries, which generally only account for a minimal percentage 
of drug sales world-wide”); cf. Anawalt, supra note 113, at 397 (“Adequate 
incentives for innovation do not depend on mandatory international 
intellectual property rules.”). 
 123. See Oddi, supra note 115, at 846. 
 124. Cf. Carroll, supra note 72, at 2468 (noting that additional costs of a 
patent system come in the form of creating legislation, establishing patent 
administrations, and training patent officials, lawyers, and judges to 
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increase in local technological development or in access to 
inventions that are patent-induced.  Still, consideration of the 
most dramatic case, which is access to vital pharmaceuticals, 
shows that the problem is more complex than this basic 
theoretical analysis would suggest. 
In an effort to investigate the effect of patent laws on 
access to effective treatment in developing countries, Amir 
Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White looked at the availability of 
antiretroviral drugs for AIDS treatment in Africa.125  
Somewhat surprisingly, and contrary to conventional wisdom, 
they found no correlation between access to antiretroviral 
treatment and patent status across Africa.126  They also 
discovered that the option to patent antiretroviral drugs often 
went unexercised, surely the result of the meager expected 
financial return from very poor countries.127  This supports 
Professor Oddi’s conclusion that increased incentive for 
innovation from the possibility of obtaining patents in poor 
countries is negligible, that is, none of these drugs is “patent-
induced” with respect to the laws of any given African country.  
Access to these drugs was found to be uniformly poor across 
Africa, independent of whether and where they were 
patented.128  Thus, at least in the poorest countries, access to 
potentially lifesaving drugs seems not to be inhibited by 
patents but rather by the lack of funding to obtain access to 
these drugs even at prices set only to reflect the cost of 
production and distribution.129 
This suggests that the problem of access to inventions, and 
technology generally, in developing countries will not be solved 
by denial of patents in those countries.  It certainly will not be 
solved by denying patents in the developed world, if such denial 
eliminates the incentive for their discovery, because the 
innovations will then not be available to anybody.  It also 
brings us back to the fundamental nature of intellectual 
property and, in particular, its infinite multiplicity without 
reduction of supply.  We can ask, if a given market offers no 
                                                          
administer and enforce patents). 
 125. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral 
Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886 (2001). 
 126. Id. at 1890. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 1890 (noting the sole exception of South Africa). 
 129. See id. at 1891; Lazzarini, supra note 12, at 135. 
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expected return from the exploitation of intellectual property, 
why should the owner of the intellectual property care whether 
the product embodying such intellectual property is copied and 
distributed in that market? 
Consider an extreme case for the sake of illustration. 
Suppose country X has zero dollars to pay for a patented and 
potentially lifesaving drug.  The patentee could not have been 
thinking of country X as part of his expected return while 
developing the drug, and indeed the patentee gets no return 
from country X after the drug is on the market, whether or not 
the drug is copied and distributed in country X.  The copying 
and distributing of the drug in country X does nothing to the 
patentee’s exclusive right to market the drug in other countries 
where it is patented and where people can afford to pay for it.  
This activity thus has utterly no effect on the patentee, 
provided all of the drug copied and distributed in country X 
actually stays in and is used for the benefit solely of country X’s 
citizens.  The problem for the patentee then, is not the copying 
and distribution in country X, but rather the potential for 
copies made in X to be distributed outside X (gray-market 
leakage) in markets where the drug is profitable for the 
patentee, because such leakage has the potential to reduce the 
price and authorized sales volume in those markets.130  There 
is no economic reason, therefore, why the patentee (on these 
extreme facts) would be unwilling to sell the drug in country X 
at cost, provided she could ensure that none of it would leak 
back into her more lucrative markets.131  In other words, the 
presence or absence of a patent law in country X is essentially 
irrelevant to the patentee.  Her only concern is with 
competition in her other markets from drugs originally 
distributed in country X. 
In any realistic situation, of course, there will always be at 
least a few people who can afford to pay the patentee’s price, so 
selling the drug at cost would actually reduce the patentee’s 
return.  However, for the poorest countries of the world, the 
                                                          
 130. See F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access 
to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations, 2002 J. INT’L ECON. L. 913, 928 
(“When prices are higher in one nation than in others, there is a tendency for 
arbitrage to occur through what is known as ‘parallel trade.’”).  
 131. See Kieff, supra note 39, at 311 & n.23 (showing more generally that 
enforceable and accurate price discrimination should push output to meet 
demand, but for this to occur arbitrage between high- and low-value users 
must be prevented). 
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number of such people will be very small.  For other countries, 
where more resources are available for health care, 
discriminatory pricing (charging more where the demand is 
inelastic and less where it is elastic) will likely result in wider 
access to drugs in developing countries and a profit to the 
patentee.132  However, patentee drug manufacturers will avoid 
these schemes if products sold at a low price in one country find 
their way back to their more lucrative markets.  Such schemes 
are also undermined if developed countries adopt notions of 
“reference pricing,” requiring, for example, their own domestic 
prices to be no higher than those charged elsewhere.133  
Moreover, under any price discrimination scheme aimed at 
maximizing the patentee’s profits, the price will likely be 
higher than it would in the absence of patent’s exclusive rights, 
so patent continues to reduce access below that of a completely 
free market.134 
TRIPS does allow some amelioration of patent’s exclusive 
rights through compulsory licensing.135  The Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health expressly gave 
member states the freedom to determine the grounds on which 
compulsory licenses can be granted.136  The problem was that 
                                                          
 132. See Scherer & Watal, supra note 130, at 925-28; Lazzarini, supra note 
12, at 125. 
 133. See Scherer & Watal, supra note 130, at 929. 
 134. Another variation of the problem of balancing public access with the 
need for incentives occurs in university research.  Research universities 
actively seek both to garner the financial returns that are available from 
patented research and to engage in public service.  A number of research 
universities have formed the Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource for 
Agriculture in an effort to standardize their licensing practices to allow them 
to engage in humanitarian endeavors.  Some of these universities are owners 
of valuable biotech patents that they have licensed away and now need to use 
in efforts to create new crops that could feed impoverished people.  The patent 
rights thereby stand in the way of the humanitarian mission.  One idea is to 
include a “humanitarian use” clause in future licenses to make sure that 
universities retain the right to engage in such activities. See Blumenstyk, 
supra note 60. 
 135. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 31; see also Lazzarini, supra note 12, at 
125. 
 136. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, ¶ 5(b), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration].  In most cases compulsory licenses can only be granted after 
good faith negotiations with the patentee have failed to result in a voluntary 
license “on reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”  TRIPS, supra note 
3, at art. 31(b).  However, nothing in TRIPS supplies any standard of 
reasonableness, so failure of the patentee to agree to a member state’s good 
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many countries lacked the facilities and technological expertise 
to manufacture complex pharmaceuticals locally.  While the 
compulsory license could include imports, the only legally 
available suppliers were the patentee and the patentee’s 
voluntary licensees.  Any other country manufacturing the 
drug under a compulsory license could only do so, under TRIPS, 
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market” of the 
manufacturing country.137  Exporting to countries unable to 
produce for their own market would thereby have placed the 
manufacturing country in violation of TRIPS.  The Doha 
Declaration recognized this problem and instructed the TRIPS 
Council to find a solution.138  The TRIPS Council then adopted 
a decision waiving the obligations of an exporting member 
under TRIPS with respect to a compulsory license to produce 
and export pharmaceuticals to “eligible importing Members,” 
subject to conditions like producing no more than necessary to 
meet the needs of the eligible importing country.139 
We may conclude that access to patented inventions, 
especially pharmaceuticals, is not as great as it might be were 
these inventions unpatented everywhere in the world.  TRIPS 
is part of the problem, and the perceived danger of parallel 
importing is another.140  It is important that these problems be 
resolved in a way that maximizes worldwide access to 
innovation of all types, but especially to lifesaving 
pharmaceuticals, and avoids undercutting incentives for 
innovation in the developed countries.  To many it seems just 
plain wrong not to provide universal access to lifesaving 
                                                          
faith offer to pay what it believes it can afford, given its other obligations and 
the country’s needs, should suffice to permit going ahead with the compulsory 
license.  Moreover, even the obligation to negotiate is waived in cases deemed 
to be a “national emergency.”  Id. 
 137. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 31(f). 
 138. Doha Declaration, supra note 136, ¶ 6. 
 139. World Trade Organization General Council, Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004). 
 140. Some drug manufacturers have begun experimenting with “out-
licensing,” under which the patentee licenses generic manufacturers who 
agree to supply medicines to poorer countries.  See Michael A. Friedman, Henk 
den Besten & Amir Attaran, Out-Licensing: A Practical Approach for 
Improvement of Access to Medicines in Poor Countries, 361 LANCET 341 (2003).  
Requiring pills to have different colors and shapes could be helpful in 
inhibiting parallel importing back into the more lucrative markets.  See id. at 
343; see also Scott Hensley, Pharmacia Nears Generics Deal on AIDS Drug for 
Poor Nations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2003, at A1. 
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innovations in pharmaceuticals.141  We are forced, however, to 
make a tradeoff between universal access to existing technology 
and future access to new technology.  If the attempt to supply 
universal access to a given innovation reduces or eliminates 
future innovation, the ultimate result is no, or at least reduced, 
access to innovation for anybody. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the effect of patent rights in biotechnological 
inventions on the interests of indigenous peoples requires a 
more nuanced analysis than has generally appeared in the 
literature.  The problem of so-called “biopiracy” is not one of the 
availability of patents based on traditional indigenous 
information but rather one of failure to share fairly the profits 
that ultimately derive from developing the information into a 
valuable product.  Patents on naturally occurring genes and 
gene products raise serious problems under traditional patent 
law on both technical and policy grounds, and they raise 
important ethical questions as well.  These problems and 
questions, however, are not unique to indigenous peoples.  
Rather, they should, and must, be addressed by all peoples in 
the world, developing and developed.  The basic problem with 
respect to indigenous peoples is patent law generally, beyond 
mere biotech patents, and whether its forced adoption by 
                                                          
 141. See Seeratan, supra note 14, at 403-04 (“Many human rights activists 
assert that the TRIPs provisions on the patenting of pharmaceuticals violates 
basic human rights by compromising the ability of poor countries to access 
essential medicines.”).  The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights demands that “[b]enefits from advances in biology, genetics 
and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made available to all, 
with due regard for the dignity and human rights of each individual.”  
Universal Declaration, supra note 91, at art. 12(a).  Another commentator 
argues that distributive justice requires providing all countries with access to 
the benefits of gene research.  See Looney, supra note 9, at 240 (“Gene 
patenting is ethically suspect if it concentrates genome benefits in those few 
countries fortunate enough to have the resources to obtain gene patents, when 
all humans should enjoy such benefits.”).  In these situations, however, it is 
not clear why gene patents or even medicine generally are singled out.  
Starvation is a huge problem in the world, which has a production capability 
more than sufficient to supply everyone alive with at least a minimal food 
supply.  Unequal distribution of resources, both natural and human-made, 
almost inevitably raises questions of distributive justice.  To the extent patent 
law serves as an incentive for innovation, patent law does not create the 
injustice.  It only brings more clearly into focus the widely different access to 
valuable resources among rich and poor countries. 
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TRIPS will result in a net benefit to developing countries.  
Serious questions have been raised concerning whether local 
adoption of a patent law will improve technology transfer or 
increase access to desirable inventions in those countries.  The 
issue boils down to the extent the absence of patent protection 
in developing countries erodes the incentive for innovation in 
developed countries, either through the absence of a profitable 
market in countries lacking a patent law or through gray-
market arbitrage that allows patented products to flow back 
into the markets that do serve as an important part of the 
incentive to innovate. 
 
